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JURISDICTION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1
Did the lower court err in dismissing Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review as cited by the Defendant with regard to subject matter
jurisdiction has been correctly stated as a Correction of Error Standard.
ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was properly preserved by the Defendant.
However, the trial court did not rule on the issue of personal jurisdiction and the same is not
properly before the Court, despite Defendant's assertion to the contrary.
ISSUE NO. 2
Did the lower court err in dismissing Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce for lack of personal jurisdiction?
ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
The issue of personal jurisdiction was a defense raised in the Plaintiffs Answer to the
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. However, Plaintiff s jurisdictional
argument, which was adopted by the district court, both in briefing [R. 42 - 48] and in oral
argument [R. 76 - 86] was limited to the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
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The district court's decision was also limited to the question of subject matter jurisdiction. [R.
83, lines 2 - 25]
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
Amend V
No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or process, without due process of law.
Amend XIV
...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Article I §7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I §11
All courts shall be open, ...and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
STATUTES:
Utah Code Ann. §78-22a-2
(1)
As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order
of a court of the United States or of any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit
in this state.
(2)
A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act
of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any district court in
Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment
of a district court of Utah.
(3)
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is subject to
the same procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating,
setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state.
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Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7) (g) (i)
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the
time of the divorce.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support,
having residing, in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding
subsequent departure from the state; or the commission of this state of the act giving
rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act, or
occurrence over which the defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives rise to a
paternity suite under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of
establishing responsibility for child support.
California Family Code $4822
All duties of support, including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable by an action
under this chapter, including a proceeding for civil contempt. The defense that the parties are
immune to suit because of their relationship as husband and wife or parent and child is not
available to the obligor.
RULES:
Rule 6-404. Utah Code of Judicial Administration
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing of a petition
to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition and summons upon the opposing
party shall be in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. No request for a modification of any existing decree shall be raised by way of an
order to show cause.
3

(2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after service of the
petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. Upon filing of the certificate,
the matter shall be referred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to trial, or in those
districts where there is not a domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar.
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order to show
cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce which requested a
modification of the amount of spousal support he was ordered to pay to the Plaintiff.

The

modification request was based upon an alleged material change in circumstances. The district
court dismissed the Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce holding that the
Utah court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Judgment of Dissolution and Order
after Hearing because the California court retains jurisdiction for modification purposes even
though the Plaintiff domesticated the California decree for enforcement purposes.
II.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A Judgment of Dissolution was entered on or about December 5, 1991 in the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino, which dissolved the marriage
between the Plaintiff, Dorena Bankler, and the Defendant, Jack Bankler. The Judgment of
Dissolution provided for spousal support for a period of 4 years. Plaintiff sought continuation
of the spousal support beyond the original 4 year period for an additional 4 year period. After
a hearing the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino entered
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an "Order After Hearing" on or about April 2, 1996, which continued the spousal support for the
requested additional 4 year period.
Plaintiff domesticated the above California orders in the Fifth Judicial District Court of
Washington County, State of Utah on or about July 18, 1996. Plaintiff also sought enforcement
of the California orders through the district court in Washington County, State of Utah, by filing
a Motion for Order to Show Cause and an Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to Show
Cause. An Order to Show Cause was issued and served upon the Defendant. The Order to Show
Cause hearing was held on November 15, 1996, wherein the court found that the Defendant had
willfully failed to pay his alimony obligation and therefore was in contempt and the order of the
court was a sentence of 30 days in the Washington County Jail. However, the sentence was
stayed for review on December 13, 1996, and the Defendant was provided the opportunity
to purge himself of contempt by renewing the payment schedule ordered by the California court.
At the review hearing held on December 13, 1996, the Court further continued the order to show
cause without making any ruling on it and re-calendared the same to January 24, 1997. The
parties stipulated to continuance of the Order to Show Cause without date at the January 24, 1997
hearing.
While the enforcement action was proceeding, the Defendant filed a Verified Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce on about November 15, 1996, and the same was served upon the
Plaintiff while she attended the Order to Show Cause hearing on November 15, 1997. Plaintiff
filed an Answer to the Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and raised the affirmative
defenses of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdictional, and improper venue, among
others.
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III.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The parties briefed the jurisdictional issues to the district court in the modification action.
Argument was heard on December 13, 1996, and the district court found that the court had no
jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce and dismissed the Defendant's Verified Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce.
Defendant, thereafter, filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff obtained a Judgment of Dissolution on December 5, 1991. [R. 1 - 7] The
divorce decree incorporated the parties' agreement which awarded the Plaintiff $1,200 per month
as spousal support for a period of 4 years, from October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1995. [R. 2,
paragraph 1] The parties' agreement also provided that the court "maintained] jurisdiction over
spoual [sic] support for an additional 4 years" at which time it was to forever terminate. [R. 2,
paragraph 1] The parties' agreement further provided that the agreement would be "subject to
and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." [R. 6, paragraph 17]
Defendant paid the Plaintiff spousal support for the duration of the first 4 year period.
On July 10, 1995 and again on August 9, 1995, Plaintiff filed and served upon the Defendant a
Notice to Appear and Produce Documents. Defendant failed to appear and the Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Compel on November 8, 1995. [R. 8] The Defendant failed to appear at the hearing
on the Motion to Compel and the court entered a Notice of Ruling which required that the
Defendant appear at a hearing on January 2, 1996. [R. 8 - 1 0 ]
The hearing was held on January 2, 1996, and the Defendant again failed to appear. The
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Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino entered an Order after
Hearing, [R. 11 - 13], which continued the spousal support in the amount of $1,200 per month
from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1999 [R. 11] and awarded the Plaintiff $3,000 in
attorney's fees.

[R. 12]

Defendant has failed to pay the Plaintiff spousal support since

September of 1995, with the exception of the $1,200 paid at the December 13, 1996 hearing to
purge himself of contempt. Defendant failed to pay the attorney fees awarded pursuant to the
Order after Hearing.
Consistent with the provisions of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Plaintiff
domesticated the Judgment of Dissolution, Notice of Ruling, and Order after Hearing, by filing
exemplified copies of the same with the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County, State
of Utah, on July 18, 1996. [R. 1-13] Plaintiff sought to enforce the California orders by filing
a Motion for Order to Show Cause [R. 18 - 19] and an Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order
to Show Cause [R. 20 - 21]. An Order to Show Cause was issued and served upon the
Defendant [R. 22 - 24]. The initial hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on November
15, 1996. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant appeared with counsel. Following argument of
counsel, wherein the Defendant was heard with respect to his allegations that a change of
circumstances occurred thus excusing his failure to pay, [R. 67 - 69], the court found that the
Defendant had willfully failed to pay his alimony obligation and therefore was in contempt and
the order of the court was a sentence of 30 days in the Washington County Jail. [R. 72b1, lines
11 - 18]]. However, the sentence was stayed for review on December 13, 1996, and the

1

Page 10 of the November 15, 1996 transcript was missed in the clerk's
numbering of the record. Plaintiff's cites to said page will therefore be
numbered 72b. Page 9 of said transcript was numbered 72 and page 11 of said
transcript was numbered 73.
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Defendant was provided the opportunity "to purge himself of contempt by renewing the payment
schedule ordered by the California court." [R. 72b, line 25; 73, line 1]
At the review hearing on December 13, 1996, the Defendant tendered to the Plaintiff
$1,200 which was the first and last money Plaintiff has received from the Defendant since
September, 1995. The district court purged the Defendant's contempt in light of the $1,200
payment and continued the order to show cause hearing without making any further ruling. The
order to show cause proceedings were continued until January 24, 1997. [R. 84, lines 17 - 19].
The parties stipulated to continuance of the Order to Show Cause without date at the January 24,
1997 hearing. [R. 89, lines 20 - 22].
While the events of the Order to Show Cause were proceeding, the Defendant filed a
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on or about November 15, 1996, [R. 28], and the
same was served upon the Plaintiff while she attended the Order to Show Cause hearing on
November 15, 1997. Plaintiff raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at the November 15,
1996 in the enforcement proceedings. The court requested briefing of the jurisdictional issues
and the same were submitted by the parties. [R. 37 - 41, Defendant's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities with regard to Jurisdiction of a Foreign Decree] and [R. 42 - 48, Plaintiffs
Memorandum] Argument was heard on December 13, 1996, and the district court found that it
lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce and dismissed the Defendant's Verified
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce with prejudice. [R. 83, lines 4 - 1 8 ] An order of dismissal
was entered on or about January 24, 1997. [R. 54]
Defendant, thereafter, filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. [R. 57]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is the position of the Plaintiff that a Utah court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
modify a divorce decree of a California court. It is well settled in Utah that the court which
originally hears the divorce proceeding retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders. This is especially true in a case such as the one at hand
where the California court specifically retained jurisdiction over spousal support through 1999
pursuant to the parties' agreement at which time spousal support would terminate permanently.
Full faith and credit requires that the California orders are deemed res judicata in this forum.
The Plaintiffs acts of domesticating the California orders, pursuant to the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act and subsequent enforcement proceedings, do not change the exclusive jurisdiction,
as the rights and defenses preserved by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act are only those which the
Defendant may constitutionally raise. Otherwise, there would be no finality to foreign judgments
and forum shopping would be encouraged.
The enforcement proceedings which the Plaintiff brought and the modification proceedings
which the Defendant sought are not the same action. With regard to the Defendant's assertions
and attempts to join the two proceedings into one, the Defendant had and continues to have the
opportunity to be fully heard as to why he could not pay the spousal support payments that he
has failed and refused to make and which the Plaintiff sought to be enforced.

Defendant also

had and continues to have a forum, in California, wherein he can modify his divorce decree
should he choose to do so. Defendant was not denied access to the courts nor denied due process
or equal protection.
The district court did not decide the issue of personal jurisdiction and therefore whether
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or not personal jurisdiction is not properly before this court. However, if the issue is before this
court a review of Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Ann., and the Plaintiffs minimum contacts would
be required.
ARGUMENT
L
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
It is well settled that the court which originally hears proceedings involving a divorce
action retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
in the matter. Utah has codified said rule in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) which states in
relevant part that the court "has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony".

Guidance is also provided by Rule 6-404, Code of Judicial

Administration. Rule 6-404 provides in part that "[proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall
be commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce action".
In the case at hand the California court specifically retained jurisdiction over the spousal
support issue for the eight years. The parties' agreement as incorporated into the Judgment of
Dissolution after providing for an initial 4 year period of spousal support sets forth that "[t]he
court shall maintain jurisdiction over spoual [sic] support for an additional 4 years at which time
it shall forever terminate and the court shall lose jurisdiction."

[R. 2, paragraph 1]

In

Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (1992), the Wife petitioned the Third Judicial
District court for modification of a divorce decree despite the initial proceeding being in the Fifth
Judicial District court. The Third Judicial District denied the Husband's motion for dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In reversing the Third Judicial District court's decision, the
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Court of Appeals indicated that:
A party can no more ask a different court to modify a divorce decree already entered than
it can ask a different court for a new trial in a case otherwise concluded. To hold
otherwise would do great mischief to orderly judicial process and would encourage forum
shopping.
Rimensburger, at 710. The Court further stated that "the court issuing the original decree retains
exclusive jurisdiction to modify its decrees" and a party "wishing to modify a decree must do so
in the original forum." Id
In the case of Angel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 1982) (per curiam),
a petition to modify a foreign decree, Nevada, was filed by Angel's ex-husband. Angel filed a
motion to change venue which was denied by the lower court. Angel sought an extraordinary
writ in the nature of Mandamus to compel the lower court to change venue. In dicta the Court
recognized the position taken by the Plaintiff in these proceedings, that an action to modify a
divorce decree should "properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree." Angel at 406
-407.
Defendant contends that two states may have simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction and that
the Utah court should take concurrent jurisdiction in this matter and allow his petition to modify
to proceed. Defendant cites the case of Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct.App. 1992)
to support his position. The Holm case provides no support for the position of the Defendant in
this matter. Holm dealt with jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), codified at 78-45c-l et seq, wherein simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction in child
custody cases is specifically provided for. How Holm and the UCCJA have any relevance in
these proceedings and the issue before this court, i.e. subject matter jurisdiction of the spousal
support provisions of a domesticated foreign decree, are unclear to the Plaintiff.
11

In this matter the original decree and subsequent ruling after hearing, which the Plaintiff
domesticated for enforcement purposes, were issued by the California court. The parties agreed
that the California court would retain jurisdiction over spousal support for an 8 year period. That
forum continues to be available to the Defendant to modify the decree should the Defendant
choose to do so. Neither the Defendant's relocating to Utah, nor the Plaintiffs domestication of
the California decree for enforcement proceedings alters the res judicata effect of said orders nor
the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of the original issuing court to modify said decree.
II.
UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT
Plaintiff domesticated the California orders in the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions
of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, §78-22a-2, Utah Code Ann. Plaintiff also proceeded in the
lower court to enforce said California orders by seeking civil contempt and attorney's fees.
Defendant's reliance on the Plaintiffs domestication and enforcement of the California orders
to confer subject matter jurisdiction to pursue modification of the California orders is misplaced.
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act states in relevant part:
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is subject to the same
procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating,
setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state.
Section 78-22a-2(3). Therefore, the Defendant can defend, enforce, satisfy, reopen, vacate, set
aside, or stay the judgment. However, noticeably lacking in the specific language of the Act is
the ability to modify the foreign judgment. Defendant's attempt to claim that his petition to
modify is really "reopening" and therefore allowed by the clear language of the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act is disingenuous at best.

Modification is one thing and re-opening another.
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including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable . . . including a proceeding for civil
contempt." Section 4822, Cal. Fam. Code. Therefore, Plaintiffs actions to enforce the spousal
support award by an action for civil contempt should not subject her California order to
modification here in a Utah court absent some authority to the contrary. Defendant has provided
no such authority.
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DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Defendant argues that under both the Constitution of the United States and of Utah that
dismissal of his Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce denied him his rights to due
process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities. The lower court's dismissal of the
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce has nothing to do with the
Defendant's due process, equal protection, or privileges and immunities claims.
In Holm, supra, the court addressed a due process argument and stated that:
The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and
demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. One of the
fundamental requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard.
(Citations omitted) Id, at 164. Therefore, fundamental to due process is one's right to have her
day in court.
If the Plaintiff understands the Defendant's position correctly, the Defendant is claiming
that his constitutional rights of due process as set forth in Article I §7, Utah Constitution, and the
V and XIV amendments to the United States Constitution were denied when his Verified Petition
to Modify Decree of Divorce was dismissed. Defendant contends that the dismissal subjected him
to the loss of liberty, the 30 day jail sentence, and property, alimony and attorneys fees, which
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involve the long arm statute, §78-27-24, Utah Code Ann., and a minimum contacts analysis
similar to that set forth in Anderson v. Am. Soc. of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990);
cert, denied. 502 U.S. 900, 112 S.Ct. 276, 116 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1991).
CONCLUSION
The Defendant had his "day in court" in the enforcement proceedings and therefore there
is no due process or equal protection issues. The Defendant also had an opportunity to be heard
in California to contest the continuation of spousal support for the second 4 year period. That
forum was chosen by the parties to retain the exclusive jurisdiction of the spousal support issue
through September of 1999 at which time jurisdiction terminates. No concurrent jurisdiction lies
due to the UCCJA. Utah should give full faith and credit to the California orders. The mere
domestication of the California orders and enforcement efforts under the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. The defenses available to the Defendant by virtue
of the domestication are those that are constitutional in nature.
The issue of personal jurisdiction was not ruled upon by the district court and therefore
not properly preserved.
The district courts holding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify the California
decree and subsequent order should be sustained on appeal.
DATED this

b

day of October, 1997.

2*>

RONALD L "READ, FOR
HUGHES & READ
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